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Abstract
Political candidates often believe they must focus their campaign efforts on a small number of swing voters open for
ideological change. Based on the wisdom of opinion polls, this might seem like a good idea. But do most voters really hold
their political attitudes so firmly that they are unreceptive to persuasion? We tested this premise during the most recent
general election in Sweden, in which a left- and a right-wing coalition were locked in a close race. We asked our participants
to state their voter intention, and presented them with a political survey of wedge issues between the two coalitions. Using
a sleight-of-hand we then altered their replies to place them in the opposite political camp, and invited them to reason
about their attitudes on the manipulated issues. Finally, we summarized their survey score, and asked for their voter
intention again. The results showed that no more than 22% of the manipulated replies were detected, and that a full 92% of
the participants accepted and endorsed our altered political survey score. Furthermore, the final voter intention question
indicated that as many as 48% (69.2%) were willing to consider a left-right coalition shift. This can be contrasted with the
established polls tracking the Swedish election, which registered maximally 10% voters open for a swing. Our results
indicate that political attitudes and partisan divisions can be far more flexible than what is assumed by the polls, and that
people can reason about the factual issues of the campaign with considerable openness to change.
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Introduction
With the proliferation of public polls from both media, political
organizations, and the parties involved, European and US
elections now seems to generates almost as much controversy
about the polling as the candidates and issues themselves. In
particular, it has become commonplace to question the scientific
integrity of the polls, and view them as partisan instruments of
persuasion [1]. For example, during the recent 2012 US
presidential campaign many political commentators suggested
the mainstream polls were based on flawed assumptions, and
harbored a systematic bias that needed to be ‘unskewed’ [2–4].
However, in the aftermath of the election it was concluded that
professional polling organizations generally did a good job of
predicting the outcome (albeit underestimating the winning
margin for president Obama [5]), and that independent
aggregators of the polls, such as Votamatic, FiveThirtyEight,
Princeton Election Consortium, or the HuffPost Pollster was
particularly accurate in their calls (see Material S1 for details).
But success in calling the outcome of a race on the eve of the
election is only one aspect of the prediction game. More
important in both understanding and running a campaign is the
effort to delineate what could happen, to pinpoint how many
voters are receptive to different messages, and open to
ideological change. To use another example from the recent
US presidential campaign; seven weeks before the election, a
video was released of republican candidate Mitt Romney,
secretly filmed during a fundraiser in Florida. In this video
Romney declares that it is not his job not to worry about the
47% of Americans that pay no income tax, because they are
not receptive to his campaign message. Instead, he asserts that
there only are 5–10% of voters that are open to move across
the partisan divide, and that those are the target demographic
he needs to convince to win the election (for the relevant
quotes, see Material S1). Independently of whether the message
of the leaked tape contributed to the failure of the Romney
campaign, one might legitimately ask whether it is a sound
strategy to run a presidential race on the premise that
maximally 10% of the electorate can be swung across party
lines? Are most voters so firmly locked in their views that they
are unreceptive to any attempts at persuasion, even from the
concentrated effort of a billion dollar campaign machinery [6]?
Looking at the research, this seems to be the case. The most
salient contrast across the political landscape in the US and the
EU is the left vs. right wing division. Despite a trend towards
diminishing party affiliation among voters, partisanship across the
left-right divide still holds a firm grip on the international Western
electorate, and has even shown evidence of further polarization in
recent years (e.g. see [7–10] for analysis relating to the condition in
the US, and [11–13] for the EU perspective, see also [14,15] for
cross cultural comparisons).
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We were given an opportunity to test this premise during the
final stretch of the 2010 general election in Sweden. Based on our
previous research on the phenomenon of choice blindness (CB
[16,17]) our hypothesis was that if we could direct the focus of our
participants towards the dividing policy issues of the campaign,
and away from the overarching ideological labels of the competing
parties, we could use CB to demonstrate far greater flexibility in
their political affiliations than what is standardly assumed.
Like in the US, the Swedish electorate is regarded as one of the
most securely divided populations in the world (albeit shifted
somewhat to the left compared to the US continuum). When we
entered into the study, the tracking polls from commercial and
government institutes were polling the Swedish electorate at about
10% undecided between the two opposing coalitions social
democrats/green vs. conservatives (provided by Statistics Sweden
(J. Eklund, unpublished data, 2012)), with the conventional
wisdom of political science identifying very few additional voters
open for a swing at the final stretch of the campaign [18–20].
Methods
Participants
In total, 162 volunteers (98 female) divided in two conditions
(manipulated and control) participated in the study. Ages ranged
from 18 to 88 years (M = 29.7, SD 14.1). We recruited our
participants from various locations in the cities of Malmo¨ and
Lund in Sweden, and asked them if they wanted to fill in a
questionnaire concerning their views on political issues. Partici-
pants who did not intend to vote, or who had already voted by
mail were not admitted into the study. Two participants were
removed due to technical problems with the manipulation process
(the glued-on piece of paper did not stick and fell off during the
discussion, see procedure figure 1). All participants gave informed
consent.
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Lund University Ethics board,
D.nr. 2008–2435.
Procedure and Materials
We introduced ourselves as researchers from Lund University
with an interest in knowing the general nature of political opinions.
We emphasized that participation was fully anonymous, that we
had no political agenda, and that we would not argue with or
judge the participants in any way. After this, we presented the
participants with an ‘election compass’; a survey with salient issues
from the ongoing election campaign where the left- and the right-
wing coalition held opposite positions.
At the start of the questionnaire, the participants were asked to
indicate how politically engaged they were (on a scale from
extremely disengaged, to extremely engaged), and how certain
they were in their political views (from extremely uncertain, to
extremely certain). Next, they were asked to indicate the direction
and certainty of their current voting intention on a 100 mm
bidirectional scale (from extremely certain social democrat/green,
to extremely certain conservatives, with the midpoint of the scale
representing undecided).
The main survey consisted of 12 salient political issues taken
from the official coalition platforms where the two sides held
opposing views. On the survey, the issues were phrased as
statements, such as: ‘‘Gasoline taxes should be increased’’ or ‘‘Healthcare
benefits should be time limited’’. We asked the participants to indicate
their level of agreement with the statements on a 0–100% scale
(where 0% meant absolutely disagree, and 100% absolutely agree,
and the midpoint represented uncertainty/indecision). To avoid
any obvious patterning of the answers on the form, the statements
were formulated both in the positive and the negative (i.e. to
introduce or to remove a particular policy) and counterbalanced
for the left and right wing coalitions (see table 1).
In the neutral condition (N = 47), after having rated their
agreement with the 12 statements, we asked the participants to
explain and justify their stance on some of the issues. When they
had completed these justifications we then overlaid a color-coded
semi-transparent coalition template on their answering profile,
with red indicating left-wing and blue right-wing (note, these
colors are inverted in US politics). In collaboration with the
participants, we then tallied an aggregate ‘compass score’ for the
right and left wing side, indicating which political coalition they
favored based on the policy issues presented. We then asked the
participants to explain and comment on the summary score, and
as the final step of the experiment, to once again indicate the
direction and strength of their voting intention for the upcoming
election.
However, in the manipulated condition (N = 113), while
observing the participants filling out the form, we surreptitiously
filled out an answer sheet identical to the one given to the
participants, but created a pattern of responses supporting the
opposite of their stated voting intention. Thus, if their voting
intention supported the social democrat/green coalition, we made
a summary compass score supporting the conservatives, and vice
versa (for those that were unsure in their original voting intentions,
we created an answer profile that was the opposite of their
compass score). Then, before we asked the participants to discuss
and justify their ratings of the individual questions, we performed a
sleight-of-hand to overlay and attach our manipulated profile on
top of their original answers (see Figure 1, and Material S1 for the
background to the trick). Consequently, when we asked the
participants to discuss their answers, they were faced with an
altered position supporting the opposing coalition. For example, if
they previously thought the gasoline tax ought to be raised, they
were now asked to explain why they had indicated it ought to be
lowered.
The goal of our alterations was to bring the sum of the
participants’ answers securely to the opposing side. Thus, the
number of altered responses we made on the mirrored profile
depended on how directionally skewed the original answers were
(say 11-1 vs. 7-5). In addition, there was no predetermined rule for
the size of the manipulations across the scale. Instead, each
manipulation was made with the intent of creating an overall
believable pattern of responses on the profile (i.e. as the level of
polarization generally varied between questions, it would invite
suspicion to simply move all responses the minimal distance across
the midline of the scale). During the discussion, and later during
the summation, if the participants realized their answers were not
expressing their original opinion, they were given the opportunity
to change the rating to what they instead felt appropriate. This
way, our efforts at creating a coalition shift could be nullified by
the number of corrections made by the participants.
As in the neutral condition, after reacting to the summary score,
the final step of the experiment was for the participants to once
again indicate their voting intentions for the upcoming election.
After the experiment we explained the true purpose of the study
to all participants, and demonstrated the procedure of the
manipulation. At this point we asked whether they had suspected
anything was wrong with their answers (over and above any
previously registered corrections). We then interviewed the
participants about how they felt about the experiment, and finally,
everybody gave written consent to have their results included in
Choice Blindness and Change in Voting Intentions
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the analysis. After the study, the experimenter took notes about the
comments and explanations of the participants.
Results
Correction of Manipulated Answers
Each participant had on average 6.8 (SD = 1.9) answers
manipulated, with a mean manipulated distance of 35.7 mm
(SD = 18.7) on the 100 mm scale. The participants were explicitly
asked to state reasons on average 4.0 (SD = 1.6) of the manipulated
trials, and of those were on average 0.9 (SD = 1.0) answers
corrected by the participants to better match their original
intention (i.e. a trial-based correction rate of 22%). At an
individual level, 47% of the participants did not correct any
answers, while 53% corrected between 1–4 answers. For all
answers classified as corrected, the participants indicated that they
had misread the question, or marked the wrong end of the scale.
Only a single participant expressed any suspicion that we had
manipulated her profile.
The number of corrected answers were not related to gender,
age, or political affiliation as defined by prior voting intention
(p = n.s.). The distance being manipulated on the scale did not
differ between corrected and non-corrected answers (p = n.s.).
Finally, there were no differences in self-rated political engagement
or in political certainty between participants who corrected no
answers and participants who made one or more corrections
(p = n.s.) (See Table S1 for details).
Endorsement of Compass Score
As very few manipulated issues were corrected, we were able to
create a mismatch between the initial voting intention (or original
compass score for the uncertain group) and the manipulated
summary score for a full 92% of the participants, all of which
acknowledged and endorsed the manipulated score as their own.
Change in Voting Intention
In order to establish if the mismatch between the initial voting
intention and the manipulated compass score also influenced the
participants final voting intention, we measured the change in voting
intention from pre- to post-test, and classified it as a positive change if
it was congruent with the manipulated compass score, and as a
negative change otherwise. For example, if the participants had a
(manipulated) compass score biased towards the right wing, and their
voting intention shifted towards the right-wing coalition, this was
classified as a positive change. For the control condition, the change
between initial and final voting intention was classified as positive or
negative against their unaltered compass score. Using this measure to
compare the amount of change in voting intention between the
manipulated and the control condition, we find that there is a very
Figure 1. A step-by-step demonstration of the manipulation procedure. A. Participants indicate the direction and strength of their voting
intention for the upcoming election, and rate to what extent they agree with 12 statements that differentiates between the two political coalitions.
Meanwhile, the experimenter monitors the markings of the participants and creates an alternative answering profile favoring the opposite view. B.
The experimenter hides his alternative profile under his notebook. C. When the participants have completed the questionnaire, they hand it back to
the experimenter. The backside of the profile is prepared with an adhesive, and when the experimenter places the notebook over the questionnaire it
attaches and occludes the section containing the original ratings. D. Next, the participants are confronted with the reversed answers, and are asked
to justify the manipulated opinions. E. Then the experimenter adds a color-coded semi-transparent coalition template, and sums up which side the
participants favor. F. Finally, they are asked to justify their aggregate position, and once again indicate the direction and strength of their current
voting intention. See http://www.lucs.lu.se/cbp for a video illustration of the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060554.g001
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large change in the manipulated condition (M = 15.9, SD = 24.7)
while there is virtually no change (M = 1.72, SD = 9.9) in the control
condition (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, W = 3857.5, p,.00001,
r = 0.35, see figure 2).
In the manipulated condition, we also find that the skewness of
the compass score correlates with the amount of change in voting
intention, e.g. if an initially right-wing participant finds herself
with a left wing aggregate score of 10 vs 2, she is likely to change
her voting intention more than if the balance was 7 vs 5 (Pearson
correlation, r = 0.28, p,0.005).
As was the case with level of correction, we found no connection
between gender, age, level of political engagement, overall political
certainty, or initial political affiliation, in relation to magnitude of
change in voting intention (p = n.s.) (See Table S2 and Figure S1
for details).
If we translate the change in voting intention to categorical
political affiliation, what we find is that 10% of the participants in
the manipulated condition moved across the full ideological span,
and switched their voting intention from firmly right wing to firmly
left wing, or in the opposite direction (with a mean movement of
voting intention across the scale = 71 mm, SD = 30.2). A further
19% went from expressing certain coalition support (left or right),
to becoming entirely undecided (M = 27.2, SD = 13.2), and 6%
went from being undecided to having a clear voting intention
(M = 12.0, SD = 26.9). If we add to this the 12% that were
undecided both before and after the experiment, it means that
Table 1. The ‘‘Election Compass’’ with statements describing issues that divide the two coalitions.
1. Gasoline taxes should be increased
2. Healthcare benefits should be time limited
3. It should be possible for disruptive students to be moved from a school even against the students’ and their parents’ wishes
4. Family leave benefits reserve two months out of a total of 13 months for each of the parents. The number of months that are earmarked for each parent should be
increased, to insure greater equality
5. Employee income taxes have been lowered the past several years through the Earned Income Tax Credit. Income taxes should be lowered further
6. The law that gives the Swedish government the right to monitor email- and telephone traffic, if it suspects an external threat against Sweden, should be abolished
7. Sweden decided in 1997 that nuclear energy should be shut down. That law should now be repealed
8. A tax deduction for housekeeping services was established in 2007. It should be abolished
9. Running major hospitals as private establishments should be permitted
10. The legal age for criminal responsibility should be lowered
11. The maximum unemployment insurance benefit is about 11 000 Swedish Kronor per month after taxes. It should be increased
12. The wealth tax was abolished in 2007. It should be reinstated
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060554.t001
Figure 2. Change in voting intention in the control and in the manipulated condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060554.g002
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48% (69.2%) of the participants were willing to consider a
coalition shift. In addition, a further 10% of the participants
recorded substantial movement in the manipulated direction,
moving 20 mm or more on the 100 mm scale.
Excluding the initially undecided participants (as they are per
definition open to change), the average certainty of the initial voting
intentions of the participants was notably high (M = 37.4 mm,
SD = 13.45, with the 100 mm bidirectional scale transformed to a
50 mm unidirectional scale). If we compare the participants that
altered their voting intention with those that did not change, we find
that the latter group has a higher level of polarization (M = 34.0,
SD = 14.40; M = 40.5, SD = 11.89, Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test,
W = 789.5, p-value,0.05), indicating that they are somewhat more
resistant tochange.However, therewerenodifferences incertaintyof
initial voting intentions between participants who made corrections
(M = 30.0, SD = 18.58) and participants who did not make any
corrections (M = 31.3, SD = 19.36)(Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test,
W = 1681, p = n.s.), which indicates that greater certainty of voting
intentions does not in itself translate to a greater general awareness
about one’s political attitudes.
When looking at the post-experiment notes, one salient pattern
we find is that around 50% of the participants who were not
influenced by the manipulation referred to their ideological
identity or prior voting behavior as a reason for ignoring the
incongruent compass score. More generally, for all categories of
participants, many also expressed clear surprise and curiosity over
the fact that they failed to correct the manipulations, then argued
the opposite of their original views, and finally accepted the altered
compass score.
Discussion
There are three key steps in the current result.
First, the low correction rate of the manipulated campaign issues.
As reported above, the manipulations we made were generally not
drastic, but constituted substantial movement on the scale, and each
one of them had definitive policy implications by moving the
participants across the coalition divide on issues that would be
implemented or revoked at the coming term of government (yes,
politicians keep most of their promises! [21,22]). It is unlikely that the
low level of corrections resulted from our use ofa continuous response
profile, as we observed similar results in a previous study of morality
with a discrete numerical scale [17]. In fact, the survey concerned
highly salient issues like income- and wealth taxation, health- and
unemployment insurance, and environmental policies on gasoline
and nuclear power. As such, they were both familiar and consequen-
tial, and the participants often presented knowledgeable and
coherent arguments for the manipulated position (e.g. in contrast to
[23,24], who argue that voters generally lack knowledge about
political facts).
Another noteworthy finding here is that we found no
relationship between level of corrections and self-rated political
engagement or certainty. That is, participants who rated
themselves as politically engaged, or certain in their political
convictions, were just as likely to fail to notice a manipulation. This
complements a similar result from [17], and indicates that general
self-reports of moral- or political conviction has a low sensitivity to
predict correction rates on CB tasks.
The second main step of the study was the summation of the
compass score. Here, an overwhelming majority of the partici-
pants accepted and endorsed a manipulated political profile that
placed them in the opposite political camp. As we see it, this result
is both obvious and remarkable; obvious, in that unless the
participants had suspected some form of manipulation on our side,
endorsement of the score follows logically from the summation (the
adding was fully transparent, so it must be their score); and
remarkable in that a few individual CB manipulations can add up
to seriously challenge something as foundational as left- or right
wing identity, a division seen by both academic research and
commercial polling as one of the most stable constructs in the
political landscape [7,8].
But one can have many other reasons for giving political
support than enthusiasm or disdain for specific policies (issues
having to do with ideological commitment, trustworthiness,
leadership, etc). So, the third and most critical part of the study
concerned whether the participants’ endorsement of the ‘factual’
compass score would translate to a willingness to change their
actual voting intentions. Here, it must be remembered that the
study was conducted at the final stretch of a real election
campaign, and our ratings indicated our participants were highly
certain in their voting intentions from the onset. Despite this, what
we found was that no less than 48% of them were being open for
movement across the great partisan divide (or ‘in play’, as the
pollsters would say). Adding to this the further 10% that moved
more than 20 mm in the manipulated direction, often from
positions at the absolute far ends of the scale, it is clear that our
participants demonstrate a great deal of ideological flexibility.
This result can be compared to recent studies that have
emphasized how hard it is to influence peoples’ voting intentions
with ‘regular’ social psychology tools, like framing and dissonance
induction [25,26] (but see [27]). Still, most likely, our findings
underestimate the number of participants open to a coalition shift.
As we measured voting intentions both before and after the survey,
we set up a clear incentive for the participants to be consistent
across measurement (e.g. [28–31]). If we instead had measured
voting intention only at the end of the experiment, and used the
untampered compass score as a proxy for their political affiliation,
they would have had no previous anchor weighing on the final
voting question, and the amount of influence would probably have
been larger. Similarly, our survey contained the critical wedge
issues separating the coalitions, but not any party specific interests,
and some participants found they could dismiss the compass score
as not representative of their critical concerns (whether this was a
post-hoc rationalization or not, we cannot know). However, as our
result revealed there was no difference in correction rate between
smaller and larger manipulations on the scale, to gain additional
force for the summation score, we could have allowed the
participants to indicate which issues they cared the most about,
and then focused our CB manipulations there.
As argued by Haidt [32,33], political affiliation can be seen as
primarily being about emotional attachment, an almost tribal
sense of belonging at the ideological level. The goal of our study
was to use CB to circumvent this attachment, and get our
participants to exercise their powers of reasoning (post-hoc, or not)
on the factual issues of the campaign. Previous research has shown
that voters engaging in ideologically motivated reasoning can be
stubbornly resistant to correcting any factual misperceptions, even
to the point where contradictory information presented to them
only serve to strengthen their convictions [34]. Thus, in no part of
the experiment did we provide arguments in support or opposition
to the expressed views of the participants, instead they did all the
cognitive work themselves when reasoning about the manipulated
issues and the summary score. This way, it seems, we were able to
peel back the bumper sticker mentality encouraged by coalition
attachments, and reveal a much more nuanced stance among our
participants. But nevertheless, we get a clue about the pervasive
influence of ideology from what the participants reported at the
end of the experiment. Particularly interesting are those partici-
Choice Blindness and Change in Voting Intentions
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pants that did not alter their voting intention. In this category,
many referred to an overarching sense of coalition identity to
motivate why the manipulated compass score did not influence
them. Sometimes these participants even expressed a form of
ideological relief at the debriefing stage (‘‘pheeew… I’m not a
social democrat after all!’’).
In summary, we have demonstrated considerable levels of voter
flexibility at the cusp of a national election, with almost half of our
participants willing to consider a jump across the left-right divide.
As the recent assessment of the polling organizations and the
polling aggregators in the US confirmed, stated voting intentions
in the final weeks before an election are generally very reliable
[18,19]. This was precisely the reason we chose to conduct our
study at the stretch of a real campaign. But our result provides a
dramatic contrast to the established polls tracking the Swedish
election, which indicated that maximally 10% of the population
would be open to swing their votes, or the 5–10% of uncertain
voters that Mitt Romney revealed as the exclusive target of his US
presidential campaign (already in May, half a year before election
day). In this way, it can be seen how the polls can be spot on about
what will likely happen at the vote, yet dead wrong about the true
potential for change among the voters. We are happy that only five
dollars’ worth of paper and glue is required to make this point,
rather than a billion dollar campaign industry, but we would
advise politicians against taking to the streets with a merry horde
of choice blindness pollsters! Our result shows there is a world
beyond ideological labels and partisan divisions, where people can
approach the political issues of the campaign with considerable
openness to change. Unfortunately, the question remains how to
enter this world with no sleights-of-hand to pave the way.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 (A) Distribution of prior voting intentions and
(B) distribution of post-test voting intentions. The graphs
show how the intentions become less polarized after the
experiment.
(TIF)
Table S1 Non-significant tests reported in section ‘‘Correction
of manipulated answers.’’
(DOCX)
Table S2 Non-significant tests reported in section ‘‘Change in
voting intention.’’
(DOCX)
Material S1 The Supporting Online Text-file.
(DOCX)
Acknowledgments
We thank Anthony Barnhart, Steve Macknik and Max Maven for their
advice concerning the historical roots of the magic trick.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: LH TS PP AL BT PJ. Performed
the experiments: LH TS PP AL BT PJ. Analyzed the data: LH PP PJ.
Wrote the paper: LH PJ.
References
1. Holtz-Bacha C, Stromback J (2012) Opinion Polls and the Media: Reflecting
and Shaping Public Opinion. New York: Palgrave McMillan.
2. Jordan J (2012) Nate Silver’s Flawed Model. National Review Online. Available:
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/331192/nate-silver-s-flawed-model-
josh-jordan#. Accessed 2013 Jan 25.
3. McLaughlin D (2012) On Polling Models, Skewed and Unskewed. Red State.
Available: http://www.redstate.com/2012/10/31/on-polling-models-skewed-
unskewed/. Accessed 2013 Jan 25.
4. Easley J (2012) GOP Takes Aim at ‘Skewed’ Polls. The Hill. Available: http://
thehill.com/homenews/campaign/251413-gop-takes-aim-at-skewed-polls. Ac-
cessed 2013 Jan 25.
5. Mayer W (2012) The Disappearing - But Still Important - Swing Voter. The
Forum. doi: 10.1515/1540–8884.1520.
6. Ashkenas J, Ericson M, Parlapiano A, Willis D (2012) The 2012 Money Race:
Compare the Candidates. The New York Times. Available: http://elections.
nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance. Accessed 2013 Jan 25.
7. Abramowitz AI, Saunders KL (2008) Is Polarization a Myth? Journal of Politics
70: 542–555.
8. Lewis-Beck MS, Norpoth H, Jacoby WG, Weisberg HF (2008) The American
Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
9. Bafumi J, Shapiro RY (2009) A New Partisan Voter. Journal of Politics 71: 1–24.
10. Dodson K (2010) The Return of the American Voter? Party Polarization and
Voting Behavior, 1988 to 2004. Sociological Perspective 53: 443–449.
11. Clarke HD, Sanders D, Stewart MC, Whiteley P (2009) The American Voter’s
British Cousin. Electoral Studies 28: 632–641.
12. Kitschelt H (2010) The Comparative Analysis of Electoral and Partisan Politics:
A Comment on a Special Issue of West European Politics. West European
Politics 33: 659.
13. Enyedi Z, Deegan-Krause K (2010) Introduction: The Structure of Political
Competition in Western Europe. West European Politics 33: 415.
14. Dalton RJ (2009) Parties, Partisanship, and Democratic Politics. Perspectives on
Politics 7: 628–629.
15. Cwalina W, Falkowski A, Newman B (2010) Towards the Development of a
Cross-Cultural Model of Voter Behavior: Comparative Analysis of Poland and
the US. European Journal of Marketing 44: 351–368.
16. Johansson P, Hall L, Sikstro¨m S, Olsson A (2005) Failure to Detect Mismatches
between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task. Science 310: 116–
119.
17. Hall L, Johansson P, Strandberg T (2012) Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice
Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey. PLoS ONE 7:
e45457.
18. Petrocik JR (2009) Measuring Party Support: Leaners are not Independents.
Electoral Studies 28: 562–572.
19. Holmberg S, Oscarsson H (2004) Va¨ljare. Svenskt Va¨ljarbeteende Under 50 a˚r.
Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.
20. Oscarsson H (2007) A Matter of Fact? Knowledge Effects on the Vote in
Swedish General Elections, 1985–2002. Scandinavian Political Studies 30: 301–
322.
21. Sulkin T, Swigger N (2008) Is There Truth in Advertising? Campaign Ad
Images as Signals About Legislative Behavior. Journal of Politics 70: 232–244.
22. Sulkin T (2009) Campaign Appeals and Legislative Action. Journal of Politics 71:
1093–1108.
23. Delli Carpini M, Keeter S (1996) What Americans Know about Politics and
Why it Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
24. Kuklinski JH, Quirk PJ (2000) Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition,
Heuristics, and Mass Opinion. In: Lupia A, McCubbins MD, Popkin SL,
editors. Elements of Reason: Understanding and Expanding the Limits of
Political Rationality. London: Cambridge University Press.
25. Druckman J (2004) Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation,
and the (Ir) Relevance of Framing Effects. American Political Science Review
98: 671–686.
26. Elinder M (2009) Correcting Mistakes: Cognitive Dissonance and Political
Attitudes in Sweden and the United States. Working Paper Series, Uppsala
University, Department of Economics, 2009: 12.
27. Carter TJ, Ferguson MJ, Hassin RR (2011) A Single Exposure to the American
Flag Shifts Support Toward Republicanism Up to 8 Months Later.
Psychological Science 23.
28. Wilson T, Dunn D, Kraft D, Lisle D (1989) Introspection, Attitude Change, and
Attitude–Behavior Consistency: The Disruptive Effects of Explaining Why We
Feel the Way We Do. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 19: 123–205.
29. Krosnick JA, Abelson RP (1992) The Case for Measuring Attitude Strength in
Surveys. In: Tanur JM, editor. Questions About Questions: Inquiries Into the
Cognitive Bases of Surveys. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
30. Ariely D, Norton M (2007) How Actions Create - Not Just Reveal - Preferences.
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 12: 13–16.
31. Lee L, Amir O, Ariely D (2009) In Search of Homo Economicus: Cognitive
Noise and the Role of Emotion in Preference Consistency. Journal of Consumer
Research 36: 173–187.
32. Haidt J (2007) The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology. Science 316: 998–1002.
33. Haidt J (2012) The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics
and Religion. New York: Pantheon.
34. Nyhan B, Reifler J (2010) When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions. Political Behavior 32: 303–330.
Choice Blindness and Change in Voting Intentions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 April 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 4 | e60554
